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rom the founding of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1944 through 
the conclusion of the last round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/
World  Trade  Organization  (GATT/WTO)  talks  in  the  1990s,  the  postwar 
international order has been marked by multilateralism and the building of liberal 
regimes for trade and finance. These regimes have reduced the risks of openness 
for national economies and stimulated international exchange across the board. Like 
portfolio and foreign direct investment and trade, international migration increased 
dramatically in the postwar period. Yet, with the notable exception of refugees, 
no liberal regime for migration has emerged. Why has migration continued at such 
high levels in the absence of a regime and in the face of cyclical downturns, and 
why have states been willing to risk openness to migration?
Economists have long argued that exposure to trade leads to increased com-
petition and efficiency, resulting in greater specialization in production and a 
wider and cheaper range of goods available to consumers. Likewise, mobility of 
productive factors (labor and capital) and the reduction of transaction costs are 
seen as essential to the smooth functioning of markets. In the case of trade, the 
GATT/WTO regime was constructed through a multilateral process, with most 
favored nation status (MFN), nondiscrimination, and reciprocity as the organizing 
principles. In the case of international finance, exchange rate stability has been 
pursued unilaterally by the U.S. during the early Bretton Woods period and mul-
tilaterally through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Both 
institutions have worked to solve problems of liquidity and adjustment as they 20  James F. Hollifield
arise. In each case, the international community seems to have accepted these 
goals/goods as indivisible, and herculean political efforts have been made to 
maintain openness and solve free-rider problems.
Even though similar economic efficiency arguments can be made in favor 
of international migration, no liberal regime for migration has emerged. States 
are reluctant to expose their economies and societies to exogenous, competitive 
pressures, more so in the area of migration than in the areas of trade and finance. 
It is only at certain points in time and under certain political-economic conditions 
that states have been willing to risk openness to migration. How can we explain 
the opening and closing over time, and does openness to migration covary with 
openness to trade and investment? Is international migration simply a function of 
the ongoing globalization of economies and societies, or is it linked to changes 
in international and domestic politics?
This paper argues that openness to migration is heavily dependent upon (1) 
ideational and institutional factors, especially the willingness of states to guar-
antee a minimum basket of rights for migrants; (2) domestic political coalitions 
and alignments that are driven in part by factor proportions and intensities; and 
(3) the structure of the international system, including the presence or absence 
of international regimes. In contrast to transnational or globalization arguments 
about the weakening of state sovereignty, this paper offers evidence in support of 
a neoliberal argument that stresses the role of institutions and rights, but without 
abandoning the central precepts of realist theory. Realist theory asserts that states 
are unitary rational actors and will pursue their interests within the confines of an 
international system structured by anarchy and distribution of power. Finally, the 
paper proposes a model of strategic interaction to specify the conditions under 
which (developed and developing) states will risk migration.
Regulating Trade and Migration
The first rule of political economy is that markets do not and cannot exist in 
the absence of regulation. This is true at the national as well as the international 
level. But intervention to establish and maintain markets for goods, services, capi-
tal, and labor is more complicated at the international level because no central 
authority exists to guarantee contracts, ensure exchange rate stability, maintain 
free trade, and protect the rights of migrants. Kindleberger (1973) was one of the 
first to point out the importance of having a leader in the international economy 
willing to shoulder responsibility for establishing and maintaining a free-trading 
system.1 
Another difficulty of sustaining international markets arises from the collective-
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With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the decline of American hegemony 
in the 1970s, and the Cold War in the 1990s, multilateralism has replaced reliance on 
American political and economic power as the cornerstone of the international politi-
cal economy.2 As Rogowski (1989) and others (Milner 1997) have demonstrated, eco-
nomic openness can have a dramatic effect on domestic political alignments, making 
it difficult to maintain support for trade even in the most outward-looking states, 
including Great Britain in the nineteenth century (Pax Britannica) and the U.S. in the 
post–World War II period (Pax Americana). In some respects, migration carries even 
greater risks (of political and social instability), especially for receiving societies.
Powerful liberal states have found ways to overcome these hurdles, primarily 
through multilateralism and the building of international institutions that help to 
lock even the most protectionist states into a more open world economy. Con-
stant political battles are fought to prevent and defeat isolationist and protectionist 
coalitions. Why do states and their political leaders do this? Simply put, because 
they recognize the enormous advantages of trade and open investment regimes. 
In the 1990s, many recalcitrant Third World states jumped on the free trade band-
wagon (the so-called Washington consensus), despite the tremendous asymmetry 
in the world economy between developed and developing economies.
But if the logic of trade and finance is one of openness, the logic of migration 
tends to be one of closure, especially for the receiving societies. From a political 
standpoint, migration is the mirror image of trade and finance. The wealthier 
states push hard to keep the lines of trade and investment open, while the poorer 
states are more skeptical, fearing dependency. With migration, it is the opposite: 
By and large, the wealthier states push hard to keep foreigners out, usually for 
reasons of national security or identity, whereas many poorer states want to ex-
port people, to reap the benefit of remittances and return migration or simply   
maintain a social safety valve. 
Yet from a historical and economic standpoint, it is exceedingly difficult to 
separate trade and capital flows from migration. Historically, the movement of 
goods, services, and capital increasingly is highly correlated with the movement 
of labor, both skilled and unskilled. Conventional economic wisdom (Heckscher–
Ohlin and Stolper–Samuelson) has it that in the long run, trade can substitute for 
migration through a process of factor price equalization.3 But in the short run, 
empirical studies demonstrate that trade leads to increased migration, especially 
when disparities in wages and incomes are very high, as they are between the 
U.S. and Mexico (P. Martin 1995). Although paradoxical, the reasons for this are 
simple: When backward economies are exposed to strong exogenous competitive 
pressures, the agricultural sector can collapse, leading to a rural exodus, swelling 
the population of cities, and increasing pressures to emigrate. Likewise, increased 
trade in services leads to high-end migration because technical and professional 
staff are integral parts of the service. The relationship between trade and migra-22  James F. Hollifield
tion is, in fact, very complex, and restrictions on one can lead to increased pres-
sure on the other.
Sorting out winners and losers is at least as complicated in the case of migra-
tion as in the case of trade. We can start from the basic premise that migration 
is heavily dependent on factor proportions and intensities and that groups will 
support or oppose migration depending upon whether they represent scarce or 
abundant factors. This is the political corollary of economic push–pull arguments, 
which hold that cross-border movements of people have a strong economic di-
mension and that such movements are basically a function of demand-pull and 
supply-push factors.4 There is little doubt that people move in search of better 
opportunities—however defined—and the existence of markets and information 
or kinship networks is a necessary condition for migration to occur. But the suf-
ficient conditions for migration are political. States must be willing to open their 
borders for exit and entry, and such openness is not simply a function of interest-
group politics or cost–benefit analyses. Ideas and institutions play a crucial role 
in determining openness or closure.
Since 1945, there has been a continuous increase in the world migrant pop-
ulation, both in developed and developing countries and across regions. This 
increase parallels similar increases in the volume of world trade and foreign 
investment, despite the absence of an international migration regime. 5 It would 
be tempting to conclude, as many sociologists and anthropologists have, that 
migration is simply a part of the inexorable process of the globalization of societ-
ies and cultures and states have little control over these movements of people.6 
The corollary of this globalization thesis is that migration will continue as long 
as there are imbalances in the international economy or until the process of 
factor price equalization is complete. But I argue that such a conclusion is not 
only simplistic and premature but wrong. We must look more closely at political 
factors that govern international migration, mindful that economic pressures for 
migration (demand-pull and supply-push) are strong and will remain so for the 
foreseeable future. To understand how politics affects the willingness of states 
to risk migration, I review several arguments for openness and closure, drawn 
from international relations theory, to develop a typology of international politi-
cal economy that will help us understand the conditions under which states can 
cooperate to manage migration.
Realism and National Security Arguments
The most venerable theory of international relations is political realism. Keo-
hane (1986, 7) succinctly summarizes the assumptions of this theory as follows: 
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itself or as a means to other ends, and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and 
large, rational and, therefore, comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.” At 
first blush, political realism would seem to tell us little about international migra-
tion other than the fact that states are sovereign, power-seeking units that act in 
their own self-interest. As such, one would expect states to protect their sover-
eignty and maximize their power by opening or closing their borders when it is 
in the national interest to do so. But this argument is not only dangerously close 
to being a tautology, it begs the question of why states at certain points in time 
open or close their borders. 
As is often the case with such pure realist arguments, we are thrown back 
onto an ad hoc analysis of state rationality, seeking to determine, for example, 
when it is in a state’s national interest to open its borders and when it is not, or 
whether out- or in-migration will enhance the state’s power and contribute to its 
national security. Neorealist theory, which builds upon the basic assumptions of 
political realism, may offer us more insight into why states open and close their 
borders. Waltz (1979) places great emphasis on the systemic nature of interna-
tional politics and the fact that the system is structured by anarchy. State behavior 
is conditioned by the distribution of power within this anarchic system. States, 
according to Waltz, are caught in an inescapable security dilemma. Any policy 
that touches upon national security must be made in response to the structure of 
the international system if a state is to survive in a world characterized by anarchy 
and the “war of all against all.” Using this perspective as a starting point, we must 
ask ourselves (1) whether or not international migration has a national security 
dimension and (2) to what extent migration and migration policy are determined 
by the structure of the international system.
The second question may be easier to answer than the first because in the 
twentieth century, we have seen massive shifts in the structure of the international 
system that have included the end of World War II, which ushered in a new era 
(1945–) of globalization (increased international exchange), and the end of the 
Cold War (1989–90), which marked a return to a more multipolar world, albeit 
one characterized by U.S. dominance. If Waltz is correct, such dramatic shifts in 
the system’s structure should have an impact on the willingness of states to risk 
openness.
What hypotheses can we derive from this theory? The intense rivalry between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. divided the world into two competing camps: communist 
and noncommunist. One result of this struggle was to create great incentives 
for cooperation among the Western democracies, institutionalizing openness to 
trade, finance, and migration. The abrupt end of the Cold War removed this 
geostrategic incentive for cooperation and has made it more difficult (in political 
terms) to sustain policies of openness.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, Western democracies, led by the U.S., con-2  James F. Hollifield
structed a liberal regime for refugees built on the 1950 Geneva Convention and 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The principles of 
this regime are well known. They are (1) asylum (based on a well-founded fear 
of persecution), (2) nonrefoulement, (3) protection, (4) nondiscrimination, (5) 
international cooperation, and (6) a commitment to search for solutions to the 
problem of refugees. Arguably, this regime was created in response to the horrors 
of World War II, which left millions of refugees and displaced persons scattered 
throughout Europe. But it was also a construct of the Cold War, designed in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s to facilitate the flight of individuals from communist 
regimes. 7 From roughly 1950 to 1990, much of the openness of liberal democra-
cies to migration can be attributed to the bipolar structure of the international 
system. Liberal states in particular felt compelled to cooperate in the building and 
maintenance of the refugee regime. The creation of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) also was a by-product of this policy.
Following the realist logic, we would expect liberal states to back away from 
some of their more liberal commitments, especially in the area of human rights 
and asylum but also trade and migration. Certainly, there is evidence in the 1990s 
that the commitment of liberal states to the refugee regime, if not to international 
labor migration, weakened. The Schengen Agreement in Europe suspended non-
refoulement for asylum seekers who passed through a “safe” third country. The 
1993 amendment of Article 16 of the German Basic Law/Constitution eliminated 
the blanket right to asylum in that country. The 1996 immigration reforms in the 
United States restricted due process and equal protection for asylum seekers, and 
the special status of Cuban refugees under American law has been attenuated. 
All of these changes indicate that liberal states are adjusting to new geopolitical 
realities and attempting to restrict migration from formerly communist states. It is 
no longer in the strategic interest of liberal states to promote refugee migration, 
but levels of labor migration continued to rise throughout the 1990s and into the 
twenty-first century. 
If we return to the more difficult question of whether migration can be de-
fined as a national security issue, we quickly run into the limitations of realist and 
neorealist arguments. Perhaps the most eloquent argument in favor of treating 
migration as a national security issue has been made by Weiner (1995), who con-
tends that migration can destabilize societies and regimes, especially in weaker 
Third World states but also in the more advanced industrial democracies. Third 
World states are particularly vulnerable because their legitimacy may already be 
precarious and they do not have the political or economic capacity to absorb 
large numbers of immigrants in short periods of time. Of the 191 million interna-
tional migrants in 2005, 61 million, or 32 percent, were in the southern (or less 
developed) countries where state capacity for managing migration is weakest. 
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resulted in the destabilization of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, demonstrating how 
threatening such massive refugee flows (in this case, Hutus fleeing Rwanda) can 
be for some states. 
Weiner extends his national security argument to the advanced industrial 
democracies by pointing out that the fear of immigration among native popula-
tions should not be dismissed as merely irrational or xenophobic. Immigration, 
he contends, threatens many groups and individuals in these countries, whether 
on economic grounds (foreigners take jobs from natives) or cultural grounds 
(foreigners threaten the political and cultural cohesion of society and the nation). 
It is accurate to say that more international migration is happening in the devel-
oped countries of the north; 62 million, or 32 percent, of migrants in 2005 moved 
from south to north, and 53 million, or 28 percent, moved within the Northern 
Hemisphere from one developed country to another. The numbers alone may 
contribute to xenophobia and nativism.
From Weiner’s national security perspective, immigration can lead to crises of 
absorption wherein societies can be further divided and destabilized. He cites the 
example of racist violence in the newly unified Germany as an example of the 
dangers of too much migration in too short a time. Looking at the U.S., Schlesinger 
(1992) and Huntington (1996, 2004) echo Weiner’s concern for the solidarity and 
stability of Western democracies when faced with large waves of immigration.8 
In addition to this “cultural threat,” migration raises concerns about terrorism and 
drug trafficking as well as environmental degradation that may result from over-
population. Each of these threats can and has been used by politicians in Western 
democracies as a justification for restricting international migration. 
Some  human  capital  arguments  reflect  the  same  national  security  logic, 
namely a concern for the power, wealth, and sovereignty of the nation-state. A 
classic example is found in the work of Borjas (1990), who poses the question 
succinctly in the title of his best-known book, Friends or Strangers? His argument 
is that immigration policy should be driven by national economic interests, and 
these should determine whether migrants are friends or strangers. As an econo-
mist, Borjas uses a strict cost–benefit calculus to determine if migrants have the 
requisite skills (human capital) needed by the national economy. He goes on to 
argue that the American economy no longer needs a large pool of unskilled and 
uneducated (largely Mexican) immigrants, and every effort should be made to re-
strict the entry of this group. The argument suggests that waves of low-skilled im-
migration will contribute to inequalities in American society and further weaken 
the national economy. The realist element in this type of economic reasoning is 
not as clear as in Weiner’s political formulation. If we adopt a strictly cost–benefit 
rationale, the interests involved in making immigration policy begin to look more 
like they belong in the realm of low rather than high politics, and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to make a national security argument for restriction.2  James F. Hollifield
For every economist like Borjas who argues against immigration, we can 
find another, like the late Julian Simon (1989), who argues in favor of increased 
immigration. Like any public policy in a democracy, immigration policy is to a 
large extent interest-driven. A political scientist, Freeman (1995), has constructed 
a rational-choice/pluralist framework for explaining the difficulties liberal democ-
racies encounter in their attempts to restrict immigration. He argues that even 
though it may be in the national interest to restrict low-skilled immigration, this 
has been difficult because powerful business interests, ethnic lobbies, intellectu-
als, and others have captured the state, making it virtually impossible for govern-
ments to carry out what is (in his view) clearly in the interest of the nation and 
society as a whole and what is demanded by the electorate and public opinion.
All of these interest-based arguments (Borjas, Simon, and Freeman) point 
to the difficulties of reducing migration to a national security issue. They also 
indicate the extent to which national security itself is a social construct. From 
the “constructivist” perspective, the interests and identities of states are heavily 
influenced by a range of sociological factors and are constructed by the actors 
involved.9 They are not—as realists would have us believe—purely a function 
of international systemic or structural factors such as the distribution of power 
within the system. This would be twice as true for international migration as it 
would be for trade and finance because migration involves the movement of 
animate rather than inanimate commodities. People are not shirts. Unlike goods 
and capital, people/foreigners have the potential to immediately and radically 
transform the culture and politics of societies in which they arrive.10
Hence, as Weiner has pointed out, migration can threaten the national secu-
rity (and identity) of the nation-state. It is, therefore, not surprising that political 
debates over defining the national interest with respect to migration can be in-
tense and emotional. But, no matter how hard we try in liberal democracies, it is 
impossible to remove cultural and social factors completely from these debates 
or reduce the terms of the debate to a cost–benefit calculation. As Weber (1947, 
158) and Lévi-Strauss (1966) remind us, all actions are not strictly economic or in-
strumental. Subjective and normative elements figure heavily in the construction 
of interests and national security.
Does this mean we can dispense with realist perspectives on international 
migration? I argue that we cannot, for two reasons. First, we must recognize the 
constraints structural factors impose upon states in their formulation of migration 
policies and their willingness to allow entry or exit. Migration policies are inex-
tricably linked with foreign policies and (from the perspective of weaker states in 
the south) with strategies for economic development. The end of the Cold War 
and its impact on the international refugee regime is a case in point. Formerly 
communist states of the East stopped restricting exit, which compelled liberal 
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must recognize the primacy of sovereignty in international relations. With few ex-
ceptions, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty and noninterference 
in the internal affairs of other states have been the central organizing principles 
of international relations—principles that are codified in international law. States 
have a sovereign right to prohibit the entry or exit of non-nationals into or from 
their territories. Even asylum seekers, covered by the Geneva Convention, have 
no right to enter and reside in the territory of signatory states. Under the conven-
tion, states are obliged to give asylum seekers a fair hearing and to abide by the 
principle of nonrefoulement; they are not required to admit asylum seekers to 
their sovereign territory. Realism remains the rule, not the exception, in interna-
tional relations.
The Globalization Thesis
The globalization thesis stems largely from works in economic sociology 
and the sociology of international relations, although some economists subscribe 
to it.11 Globalization arguments stand at the other extreme from realism, which 
stresses the role of the nation-state as the primary decisionmaking unit in in-
ternational relations. The globalization thesis comes in a variety of shapes and 
sizes, but all versions share a common assumption: The regulatory power (and 
sovereignty) of the national state has been weakened by transnational, social, 
and economic forces ranging from the internationalization of capital to the rise 
of transnational communities to the increasing importance of human rights in 
international relations. The nation-state is no longer the sole, legitimate actor in 
international relations, if it ever was. Rather, the tables have been turned against 
the state, which is unable to control either transnational corporations—especially 
banks that move vast sums of capital around the globe—or migrants who move 
in search of employment opportunities. The internationalization of capital, we are 
told, has provoked a radical restructuring of production as national economies 
move up (or down) the international product cycle. Production itself has been 
decentralized with the rise of new centers of power and wealth, which Sassen 
(1991, 22; 1996) dubbed “the global city.”
According to Sassen and others, the rise of transnational economies has re-
sulted in the creation of transnational communities as workers are forced to move 
from one state to another in search of employment, often leaving family members 
behind. Such communities can be found at both the high and low end of the la-
bor market as individuals move with more or less ease from one national society 
to another. A great deal of research has been done to document this practice 
among Mexican immigrants to the United States. Massey was one of the first to 
point out the importance of transnational social networks in linking communi-2  James F. Hollifield
ties in the country of origin to those in the country of destination. These kinship 
and informational networks helped instill confidence in potential migrants, thus 
raising their propensity to migrate and, in effect, lowering transaction costs for in-
ternational migration.12 Portes (1997; Portes and Bach 1985) argues that migrants 
have learned to use this “transnational space” as a way to get around national 
regulatory obstacles to their social mobility. He goes on to point out that changes 
in Mexican law to permit dual nationality may reinforce this type of behavior, 
leading to ever larger transnational communities.
The decline in transaction costs and the ease of communication and transpor-
tation have combined to render national migration policies obsolete. Indeed, the 
entire regulatory framework of the state with respect to labor and business has 
been shaken by the process of globalization.
To compete in the new international marketplace, business and governments 
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
have been forced to deregulate and liberalize labor and capital markets, whereas 
less developed states have been thrown into debt crises, leading to painful poli-
cies of structural adjustment that, in turn, have caused more migration from poor 
to rich states.13 A case in point is the Mexican financial crisis in the mid-1990s 
that led to the devaluation of the peso and a surge in emigration to the United 
States in the latter part of the decade (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 
1997). Likewise, developing states such as Mexico and the Philippines are forced 
to rely increasingly on migrants as a source of foreign exchange. The remittances 
that migrants send home are a source of hard cash for countries across the Third 
World, from Latin America to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In the globaliza-
tion framework, migration, like trade, leads only to growing inequalities and 
dependence within and between countries of the south. 
Politics and the state have been factored out of international relations in 
these types of globalization arguments, most of which are inspired by world-sys-
tems theory (Wallerstein 1974). Following on this apolitical logic, both trade and 
migration—which are closely linked—are largely a function of changes in the 
international division of labor. States at best play only a marginal role in determin-
ing economic and social outcomes. The prime agents of globalization are trans-
national corporations and transnational communities, if not individual migrants 
themselves.14 If states have such a minor role, any discussion of national interests, 
national security, sovereignty, or even citizenship would seem to be beside the 
point. But at least one group of sociologists has tried to bring politics and law, if 
not the state, back into the picture. 
Works by Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996) focus on the evolution of rights 
for immigrants and foreigners. Both authors posit the rise of a kind of postnation-
al regime for human rights wherein migrants are able to attain a legal status that 
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that individual migrants have achieved an international legal personality by virtue 
of various human rights conventions, and both authors view these developments 
as presenting a distinctive challenge to traditional definitions of sovereignty and 
citizenship. But Soysal in particular is careful not to use the terms postnational 
citizenship or transnational citizenship, opting instead for the expression postna-
tional membership. Wrestling with the contradictory nature of her argument, Soysal 
writes: “Incongruously, inasmuch as the ascription and codification of rights move 
beyond national frames of reference, postnational rights remain organized at the 
national level ... the exercise of universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their 
institutions.” 
Another sociologist, Bauböck (1994) is less circumspect. He argues simply 
that, given the dynamics of economic globalization, a new transnational/political 
citizenship is necessary and inevitable. Bauböck draws on political and moral 
philosophy, especially Kant, in making his argument in favor of transnational 
citizenship. Like Soysal, he relies heavily on the recent history of international 
migration in Europe and the experience of the European Community/Union to 
demonstrate that migration has accompanied the process of economic growth 
and integration in Europe and that these migrants, many of whom were guest 
workers, have achieved a rather unique status as transnational citizens. What all 
three of these authors (Soysal, Jacobson, and Bauböck) attempt to do is give 
some type of political and legal content to world-systems and globalization ar-
guments. But like Sassen, they see the nation-state as essentially outmoded and 
incapable of keeping pace with changes in the world economy.
What do these theories tell us about migration policy (the opening and clos-
ing of societies) and the willingness of states to risk migration? At first blush, they 
would seem to account rather well for the rise in migration. Even though the glo-
balization arguments are neo-Marxist in orientation, they share many assumptions 
with conventional, neoclassical (push–pull) theories of migration. 
The first and most obvious assumption is that migration is caused primarily 
by dualities in the international economy. As long as these dualities persist, there 
will be pressures for individuals to move across national boundaries in search of 
better opportunities. But whereas many neoclassical economists (like Simon) see 
this as pareto optimal—creating a rising tide that will lift all boats—globalization 
theorists (like Sassen, Piore, and Portes) view migration as further exacerbating 
dualities both in the international economy and in national labor markets. This 
variant of the globalization thesis is very close to the old Marxist argument that 
capitalism needs an industrial reserve army to surmount periodic crises in the 
process of accumulation.15 As migration networks become more sophisticated 
and transnational communities grow in scope and complexity, migration should 
continue to increase, barring some unforeseen and dramatic fall in the demand 
for immigrant labor. Even then, some globalization theorists like Cornelius (1998) 20  James F. Hollifield
would argue that the demand for foreign labor is “structurally embedded” in the 
more advanced industrial societies, which cannot function without access to a 
cheap and pliable foreign workforce.
The second (crucial) assumption that globalization theorists share with neo-
classical economists is the relatively marginal role of the state in governing and 
structuring international migration. States can act to distort or delay the develop-
ment of international markets (for goods, services, capital, and labor), but they 
cannot stop it. With respect to migration, national regulatory regimes and munici-
pal law in general simply must accommodate the development of international 
markets for skilled and unskilled workers. To talk about the opening and closing 
of societies is simply a nonstarter in a “global village” where the world is flat 
(Friedman 2006). Likewise, citizenship and rights can no longer be understood 
in their traditional national contexts. If we take the example of postwar West 
Germany, nationality and citizenship laws date from 1913, and until the reforms 
of 1999/2000, these laws retained kinship, or blood (jus sanguinis), as the prin-
cipal criterion for naturalization.16 But this very restrictionist citizenship regime 
did not prevent Germany from becoming the largest immigration country in Eu-
rope. Globalization theorists like Sassen, Portes, and Soysal explain this anomaly 
by pointing to the structural demand for foreign labor in advanced industrial 
societies, the growth of networks and transnational communities, and the rise 
of postnational membership. Postnational membership is closely tied to human 
rights regimes—what Soysal calls universal personhood. National citizenship and 
regulatory regimes would seem to explain little about the variation in migration 
flows or the openness (or closure) of German society.
A more fully developed critique of these arguments is provided in the con-
clusion. But what can we retain at this point from globalization, as opposed to 
realist, arguments? The biggest shortcoming of the globalization thesis—in con-
trast to realism—is the weakness or, in some cases, the absence of any political 
explanation for migration. The locus of power and change is in society and the 
economy. There is no place for the state in this theoretical framework. Almost 
everything is socially and economically determined. The next section reviews 
neoliberal arguments, which combine economic and political theories to explain 
why states are willing to risk free trade.
Neoliberalism and International Regimes
Neoliberal arguments, often referred to among international relations theo-
rists as liberal institutionalism, are heavily rationalist and have some things in 
common with neorealism. Both schools of thought stress the primacy of interests, 
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est” and look at the multiplicity of social and economic groups that compete to 
influence the state. For neoliberals, both national and international politics can be 
reduced to an economic game and ultimately to a problem of collective action. 
To understand this (means–ends) game, all that is needed is to correctly iden-
tify the interests and preferences of social, economic, and political actors.17 Not   
surprisingly, neoliberal theorists focus heavily on politics and policy in developed 
democracies, where the competition among groups is relatively open and unfet-
tered by authoritarianism and corruption. Studying competition among groups   
at the domestic level, as well as the allocational and distributional consequences 
of policy, presents a clearer picture of why (liberal) states behave the way they   
do in the international arena, whether in the areas of trade, finance, or migra-
tion.
Since this approach incorporates both economic and political analysis, it has 
come to be called international political economy (IPE). IPE theorists are inter-
ested in the connections between domestic and international politics. In addition 
to focusing on domestic interests, they also stress the importance of institutions 
in determining policy outcomes. For one of the original IPE theorists, Keohane, 
institutions hold the key to explaining the puzzle of conflict and cooperation in 
international relations, especially with the weakening of American hegemony in 
the last decades of the twentieth century. Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that in-
creases in economic interdependence in the postwar period have had a profound 
impact on international relations, altering the way states behave and the way in 
which they think about and use power. In the nuclear age and with growing 
interdependence, it became increasingly difficult for states to rely on traditional 
military power to guarantee their security because security was tied increasingly 
to economic power and nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the nature of 
warfare. The challenge for liberal states post-1945 was how to construct a new 
world order to promote national interests that were tied ever more closely to in-
ternational trade and investment, if not to migration.
In the first two decades after World War II, this problem was solved essentially 
by the United States, which took it upon itself to reflate the world economy and 
provide liquidity for problems of structural adjustment. This approach to interna-
tional political economy was dubbed “hegemonic stability.”18 But with the gradual 
decline of American economic dominance in the 1970s, the problem arose of 
how to organize world markets in the absence of a hegemon. The answer would 
be found, according to Keohane, Ruggie, and others, in multilateralism and the 
building of international institutions and regimes (like GATT and IMF) to solve 
the problems of international cooperation and collective action.19 As the Cold War 
waned in the 1980s, the entire field of international relations shifted dramatically 
away from the study of national security toward the study of international eco-
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century, even domestic politics, according to IPE theorists, was thoroughly inter-
nationalized (Keohane and Milner 1996).
Despite the fact that international migration would seem to lend itself to 
neoliberal arguments (migration has a strong political-economic dimension and 
clearly contributes to the internationalization of domestic politics), very little has 
been written about it from this perspective.20 The reasons are fairly simple. Until 
recently, there was little demand for international policy in the area of migration, 
with the major exception of refugees. Even for the refugee regime, the numbers 
were relatively modest until the 1980s, and incentives for cooperation among 
liberal states were closely linked to the Cold War and the bipolar structure of 
the international system. From the late 1940s through the 1970s, liberal states 
had little incentive to cooperate or build regimes for managing labor migration 
because an unlimited supply of (unskilled) labor could be recruited through bi-
lateral agreements with the sending countries. The German Gastarbeiter (1960s) 
and the American Bracero (1940s to 1960s) programs are classic examples of 
these types of bilateral accords. We did, however, see more innovation in the area 
of refugee policy, especially in Europe, where states came together to find ways 
to slow the influx of asylum seekers. The Dublin Convention and the Schengen 
Accords have helped to harmonize asylum policy in Western Europe, creating a 
border-free Europe but one in which every member state is responsible for polic-
ing a common external border. 
But the situation with international labor migration did not change that much 
in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War. Today, there is still an 
unlimited and rapidly growing supply of cheap labor available in developing 
countries. What has changed, however, are the goals of immigration and refugee 
policies of the OECD states. The demand now is for policies to control, manage, 
or stop migration and refugee flows. The Cold War refugee regime, specifically 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has come under enormous 
pressure to manage various refugee crises, including the Cambodians in Thailand, 
Kurds in Iraq, Hutus in Zaire (now the Republic of Congo), and Albanians fleeing 
Kosovo. Existing international organizations for dealing with economic migra-
tion, such as the IOM and the International Labour Office (ILO) in Geneva, have 
not been besieged by demands for action. With the major exception of Western 
Europe, which has developed a regional regime for migration, there has been 
little effort to regulate international labor migration on a multilateral basis. Even 
a clause in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) dealing with 
international labor migration (Mode 4) has done little to promote cooperation in 
the area of migration. Most OECD countries, especially the United States, are un-
interested in the creation of an international guest-worker program, and attempts 
to link trade regimes with migration have been resisted tooth and nail by both the 
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What can neoliberal theory tell us about the development of international 
migration and the willingness of states to risk migration? The first hypothesis we 
can derive from neoliberal theory is that states are more willing to risk opening 
their economies to trade (and by extension, migration) if there is some type of 
international regime (or hegemonic power) that can regulate these flows and 
solve collective-action and free-rider problems. However, as I have pointed out, 
there is no regime for regulating migration that comes close to the type of regime 
that exists for trade (GATT/WTO) or for international finance (IMF/World Bank). 
Yet we know that migration has increased steadily throughout the postwar period 
in the absence of a regime or any type of effective multilateral process. The EU 
and Schengen group are partial exceptions. If we accept the realist assumption 
that states are unitary, rational actors capable of closing as well as opening their 
economies, other (political) factors must be driving the increases in migration 
and maintaining a degree of openness to migration, at least among advanced 
industrial democracies.
The second hypothesis that can be derived from neoliberal theory focuses 
on domestic coalitions. The maintenance of a relatively open (nonmercantilist) 
world economy is heavily dependent on coalitions of powerful interests in the 
most dominant, liberal states. In Resisting Protectionism, prominent neoliberal 
theorist Helen Milner (1988, 18–44) demonstrates how advanced industrial states 
in the 1970s were able to resist the kind of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that were 
adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. She argues that growing interdependence (multi-
nationality and export dependence) helped to solidify free trade coalitions among 
the OECD states in the postwar period, thus preventing a retreat into protection-
ism following the economic downturns of the 1970s and 1980s. Government 
leaders in a range of industrial nations were willing (and able) to resist strong 
political pressures for protectionism in the 1970s in large part because a powerful 
constellation of business interests contributed to a substantial realignment within 
these societies. In some cases, polities themselves were (creatively) redesigned 
by political entrepreneurs to facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of these 
new (free trade) coalitions.22 Of course, free trade interests were bolstered by the 
existence of an international trade regime (GATT) in the 1970s. 
Therefore, from a neoliberal perspective, the central questions with respect 
to migration are: How did pro-immigration coalitions in the key OECD states 
form? And will they be able to maintain legal immigration regimes with the end 
of the Cold War and in the absence of a strong international migration regime? We 
should not discount the importance of international systemic constraints such as 
the end of the Cold War, which clearly has had an impact on political coalitions 
and alignments in all of the liberal democracies. The end of the Cold War had a 
profound impact on coalitions supporting open migration policies, even more so 
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and types of the coalitions that form to support or oppose them. Although relat-
ed, in the sense that strong economic liberals tend to support both free trade and 
more open migration policies, there is a much stronger ideational and cultural 
dimension to pro-migration coalitions than free trade coalitions.23  
Free trade policies clearly have important political and social effects, but the 
arguments about comparative advantage and tariff policies tend to be heavily 
economic, and interest groups are organized along sectoral or class lines. With 
respect to trade, individuals and groups tend to follow their market interests, 
but in the making of migration policies, this is not always the case. If a state can 
be sure of reciprocity—that other states will abide by nondiscrimination and 
the MFN principle—it is easier to convince a skeptical public to support free 
trade. With migration, on the other hand, economic arguments (about the costs 
and benefits of migration) tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and 
ideological arguments that cut across class lines. National identities and founding 
myths—what I have called national models—come into play in the making and 
unmaking of coalitions for admissionist or restrictionist migration policies (Hol-
lifield 1997a, 1997b). Debates about migration in the liberal-democratic (OECD) 
states revolve as much, if not more, around issues of rights (see next section) and 
national identity than around issues of markets or social class. The coalitions that 
form to support more-open migration policies are often rights-markets (left–right) 
oriented, and debates about sovereignty and control of borders are reduced to 
debates about national identity—a fungible concept that reflects values, morality, 
and culture rather than a strictly instrumental, economic calculus.
If we take a neoliberal approach to understanding the rise of migration in the 
postwar era, we are thrown back into an analysis of three factors that together 
drive national migration policy. 
The first of these factors is ideational, historical, and cultural. Migration pol-
icy, especially in the biggest liberal republics (the United States, France, and 
Germany), is heavily influenced by national (or founding) myths, which are codi-
fied in citizenship and nationality laws (Brubaker 1992, 165). These myths and 
national identity are subject to manipulation and involve strong elements of sym-
bolic politics. They are reflected in constitutional law and can be analyzed from 
a historical, sociological, legal, and political standpoint. 
Citizenship, like society or the economy, is subject to exogenous shocks. 
Immigration—as Weiner (1995) and Koslowski (1996) have pointed out—can 
change the composition of societies, alter political coalitions, and transform citi-
zenship and national identity. The argument, therefore, can be made that migra-
tion contributes to the internationalization of domestic politics and economics. 
Multiculturalism is the functional equivalent of multinationalism. If the rise of 
multinational corporations has contributed to the creation of new free trade co-
alitions, as Milner and others have argued, then the rise of immigration and Trade, Migration, and Economic Development  2
multiculturalism has contributed to new pro-immigration coalitions. As foreigners 
gain a legal foothold in liberal societies, rights accrue to them and they become 
political actors capable of shaping both policy and polity.24 
But there is clearly a second factor involved in building pro-migration co-
alitions. As Freeman argues, businesses that are dependent on foreign labor—
whether skilled, as in the case of the software industry, or unskilled, as in the case 
of construction trades or agriculture—can form powerful lobbies and, under the 
right conditions, capture parts of the state to maintain access to a vital input.25 The 
political and economic history of Western states since the late nineteenth century, 
when the transaction costs of migration were lower, is replete with examples of 
businesses working with, around, through, or against the state to import labor.26 
Economic interests are always at play in the making of migration policy because 
the profits to be had from importing labor are great (demand-pull forces are 
strong) and an abundant supply of cheap labor is available. Cutting off access to 
foreign labor for businesses that are heavily dependent upon it is the same thing 
as imposing high tariffs on imported raw materials. The industries affected will 
howl. Both policies are protectionist and have profound allocational effects, often 
leading to increases in irregular migration.
In the postwar period, the third and most important factor in building pro-
migration (as opposed to free trade) coalitions is institutional. Perhaps the most 
famous and oft-quoted statement about European guest-worker programs was 
made by Swiss novelist Max Frisch, who said, “We asked for workers, and hu-
man beings came.” Unlike capital or goods, migrants—as individuals and some-
times as groups (Cubans in the U.S., ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants in 
Germany)—can acquire legal rights and protections under the aegis of liberal 
constitutions and statutory law. Even when they are not admitted immediately to 
full citizenship, migrants acquire the rights of membership, which can, depending 
upon the state, include basic civil rights, a package of social, or welfare, rights, 
and even political, or voting, rights. What is important to keep in mind, however, 
is that these rights are anchored in national legal systems, and although they may 
flow from constitutional law, they also depend upon increasingly fragile political 
coalitions involving left- and right-wing liberals. With the end of the Cold War, 
these “strange bedfellow” coalitions have become more difficult to sustain, even 
in the area of political asylum, a principle that is supported in international law.27 
As the coalitions weaken, we would expect to see a concomitant decline in sup-
port for admissionist immigration and refugee policies.
But rights have a very long half-life in liberal democracies. Once they are 
extended and institutionalized, it is extremely difficult to roll them back. Most 
democracies—especially those, like the U.S., France, and Germany, with repub-
lican traditions and strong elements of separation of powers—have a variety of 
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civil, social, and political rights. To understand the “limits of immigration control” 
in liberal democracies, as well as the mix of internal and external strategies for 
control, we must have a clear understanding of the evolution of rights-based poli-
tics and of the way in which rights are institutionalized.28 Even if rights-markets 
coalitions supporting immigration weaken, this does not mean that migration and 
refugee policies will change overnight or that liberal states can quickly and ef-
fectively seal their borders. 
To conclude, the neoliberal approach requires us to look first at international 
institutions and regimes and second at the types of coalitions that form to sup-
port more-open migration regimes. I have identified three factors that influence 
coalition building: (1) ideational and cultural, which are closely linked to formal, 
legal definitions of citizenship, (2) economic interests, which are linked to factor 
proportions and intensities such as land, labor, and capital ratios, and (3) rights, 
which often flow from liberal-republican constitutions. The following sections   
develop this neoliberal framework, offering a critique of realist and globalization 
arguments.
Risking Migration and the Centrality of Rights
Of the three analytical perspectives on migration and international relations 
we have reviewed so far—realism, globalization, and neoliberalism—neoliberal-
ism comes closest to explaining why states risk migration. But, as I have indi-
cated, we cannot ignore structural or systemic factors, such as the end of the Cold 
War, that can influence the propensity of states to support liberal international 
regimes. In the absence of a threat or hegemon to unite liberal states and help 
them overcome collective-action problems, multilateralism is one way for states 
to cooperate and build a migration/refugee regime. 
Following the work of Ruggie (1993a, 3–47), we can identify three tenets   
of multilateralism. The first is indivisibility, which is another way of saying that 
multilateral regulation should take the form of a public good. Unless it is a   
hegemon, a single state or even a small group of states cannot provide this good 
for the international community. The costs and benefits of its provision must   
be shared relatively equally among states. The second tenet is principles, or norms 
of conduct, which can alter the behavior of states. The fewer principles or norms 
there are, the greater the likelihood that states will respect them and change 
their behavior. The most difficult problem in any multilateral regime is to find   
a single compelling principle (or at least a very small number of interrelated 
norms or principles) “around which actor expectations can converge.”29 Third, 
Ruggie points to diffuse reciprocity, meaning that states must be convinced ev-
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persuade a skeptical or even hostile public to accept the short-term political and 
economic costs of establishing the regime in order to reap the long-term gains.
Using this neoliberal framework, we can ask: What are the possibilities of 
building an effective international migration regime? What would be the incen-
tives to participate in such a regime? Can states overcome their misgivings, which 
may include loss of sovereignty, threats to national security and identity, and 
changes in the composition of the citizenry? 
On the first point, indivisibility, we must ask if migration can be defined as 
an international public good. As noted earlier, this is problematic, especially if we 
compare migration and trade. During the postwar period, a consensus emerged—
based on American leadership and the doctrine of comparative advantage—that 
an open trading regime would promote global welfare and advance the cause of 
peace. The motto of the immediate postwar period was “Peace through trade.” 
The GATT system was created to ensure that the costs and benefits of free trade 
would be shared equally, and this allowed the leading liberal states (especially 
the U.S.) gradually to overcome the hostility and skepticism of weaker developing 
states. Free trade would lead not only to specialization in production, increased 
output, and pareto-optimal economic outcomes, it also would promote interde-
pendence and a more peaceful world. 
This type of economic reasoning, however, does not work well in the area of 
migration because the asymmetry between developed and developing countries 
is too great. It is only at certain points in time (such as the turn of the twentieth 
century in America, the period of reconstruction in Europe after World War II, 
and  the period of very high growth in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s) that the in-
terests of developing and developed states converge. Developing states almost 
always have an incentive to export surplus populations, whereas developed states 
only periodically have an interest in admitting large numbers of foreign workers. 
The history of south-to-north migration has tended to be one of fits and starts, 
of peaks and valleys that tended to follow the business cycle. But there is strong 
evidence this dynamic may have been broken in the postwar period, at least for 
certain “core” liberal states in America and Europe (Hollifield and Zuk 1998). We 
can see this in the rates of world migration, which have been rising continuously 
since 1945. 
So, if migration does not mirror the business cycle, what is driving it? The 
answer, in a word, is rights. As the world becomes more open, more democratic, 
and more liberal, people are freer to move than ever before. This has placed great 
strains on liberal states, especially on the institution of citizenship. Liberal states 
are caught on the horns of a dilemma or, what I have called a liberal paradox 
(Hollifield 1992a, 222; Weiner 1995, 112). In liberal political and economic sys-
tems, there is constant tension between markets and rights, or liberty and equal-
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the liberal polity, especially citizenship, require some degree of closure, mainly 
to have a clear definition of citizenry and to protect the sanctity of the social 
contract —the legal cornerstone of every liberal polity. Equal protection and due 
process cannot be extended to everyone without undermining the legitimacy 
of the liberal state itself. How can states solve this dilemma and escape from 
the paradox? Constructing an international migration regime, as European Union 
members have done, is one way.
But if migration is to be defined as an international public good, it cannot 
be defined purely in economic terms, even though mobility of productive fac-
tors (like free trade) is recognized in economic theory to be pareto optimal. To 
regulate migration on a unilateral basis, liberal states must adopt draconian (il-
liberal) policies that may threaten the foundations of the liberal state itself. It is 
not efficient or desirable in a liberal state to close or seal borders. This would 
be the ultimate strategy for external control. Likewise, strategies for internal con-
trol—including heavy regulation of labor markets, limiting civil rights and liber-
ties for foreigners and citizens, and tampering with founding myths (for example, 
weakening birthright citizenship in the U.S.)—also threaten the liberal state. Such 
measures can fan the flames of racism and xenophobia by further stigmatizing 
foreigners. Establishing a multilateral process for regulating and controlling im-
migration offers one way out of this dilemma, but to accomplish this, control must 
be redefined on a multilateral basis as the “orderly movement of people” (Ghosh 
1998, chap. 5). Orderly movements imply respect for the rule of law and state 
sovereignty, which are fundamental principles in every liberal state. 
The problem remains of how to set up generalized principles of conduct in 
the area of migration. Various conventions exist, many put forward by the UN and 
its agencies (the UNHCR, IOM, and ILO) to safeguard the rights of migrant work-
ers and establish standards for the treatment of these workers and their families.30 
Likewise, Mode 4 of GATS includes provisions for migration (Bhagwati 2004). But 
none of these agreements has achieved the status of a full-blown international 
migration regime capable of altering the behavior of states. It is only with asylum 
that a quasi-effective international regime has emerged in the postwar period, 
with a single guiding principle—a well-founded fear of persecution. The free-
dom-of-movement clauses of the various European Union treaties have resulted 
in the construction of a regional migration regime for EU member states, and the 
Schengen group has developed rules for dealing with the migration of third-coun-
try nationals, specifically asylum seekers. 
In such a regional context, where the asymmetry is less pronounced than in 
the international system, it is easier to solve the problems of reciprocity and col-
lective action. Rules can be adopted and formalized through already established 
institutional procedures. At the international level, what we have seen instead is 
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Figure 1
A Typology of International Regimes
fragmented and ineffective regime (Ghosh 1998, chaps. 4 and 5). Moreover, the 
primary concern of the most powerful liberal states is not to facilitate the orderly 
movement of people (even paying tourists) or promote international factor mobil-
ity. Rather, the concern is for control, which has as many different meanings as 
there are states.
The challenge for any state or organization attempting to construct an in-
ternational migration regime will be to define control in such a way that it is 
indivisible, can serve as a generalized norm or principle of conduct, and can lead 
to diffuse reciprocity. This is no mean feat because, heretofore, international mi-
gration has been regulated almost exclusively on a bilateral basis, if not through 
some type of imperial hierarchy. In fact, we still see both regulatory systems at 
work today. It is only among the OECD states that freedom of movement (but 
not settlement) has been more or less achieved, especially for the highly skilled. 
Between the core liberal states in the international system and the less developed 
countries, movement of populations is still governed by a system of imperial 
hierarchy, which is in many ways more one-sided today than it was during the 
colonial era.31
To better understand the difficulties of international cooperation to regulate 
migration, I have constructed a typology of international regimes. This typol-
ogy, depicted in Figure 1, points to a clear distinction between the regulation of 
capital, goods, and services on one hand and migrant labor or refugees (people) 
on the other. When it comes to regulating trade and capital flows—an essential 
function of the international political economy—multilateralism is strongest and 
most heavily institutionalized in the area of finance. Even though the institutions 
dealing with international finance are far from perfect, the IMF and World Bank 
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trade and investment would be difficult and extremely risky. The GATT/WTO 
regime for trade also is heavily institutionalized, but the multilateral basis of this 
regime is, I would argue, weaker than that for finance. The need for strong cur-
rencies and stable exchange rates is felt much more acutely by states than the 
need for free trade. Nonetheless, both of these institutions have evolved together 
in the postwar period. Powerful market incentives, as well as formal enforcement 
mechanisms in the case of the WTO, compel states to “play by the rules” (Gold-
stein 1993, 201–32).
Of the two “regimes” dealing with migration, one for labor migrants and the 
other for refugees, clearly the refugee regime, which is institutionalized through 
the UNHCR, is the more effective, for reasons I have spelled out. I put the term   
regimes in quotes because the labor regime is quite ineffective. The rules for 
entry and exit of economic migrants are controlled by nation-states, not by in-
ternational organizations like the UN, IOM, or ILO. Again, the major exception 
is the EU, but the EU regime for international labor migration functions only for 
nationals of the member states, not (or at least not yet) for third-country nationals 
(Guiraudon 1998, 657–74).
Even for the Schengen states—referred to in the British press derisively as 
Schengenland—third-country nationals do not have freedom of movement. Only 
Schengen nationals have this right. Schengen does, however, function as a multi-
lateral regime for asylum and is designed to help member states restrict refugee 
migration and prevent “asylum shopping.” Refugees have the right to request 
asylum in the first Schengen state in which they arrive—consistent with the Ge-
neva Convention—but if they transit through a “safe” third country, they can be 
refoulés (sent back to that third country). The result has been to forge a more or 
less common asylum policy in Schengen and turn all adjoining states into buffer 
states. The important point is that these Western European states, together with 
the U.S. and other liberal democracies, are respecting the letter, if not the spirit, 
of international refugee law.
Although the principles of the refugee regime are widely recognized, the 
UNHCR as an institution remains weak and heavily dependent on a few “cli-
ent states,” especially Sweden, the Netherlands, and other small European social 
democracies. The Japanese contribute a lot of money to the UNHCR, and the 
Americans support it and use it as a tool for managing refugee crises around the 
world, especially when American national interests are involved.
The regime for international labor migration is weakly institutionalized with 
no central norm (Figure 1), and its principal organs, the ILO and IOM, based in 
Geneva, have little regulatory or institutional capacity. For developed states in 
particular, the costs of participating in a regime for international migration would 
seem to outweigh the benefits, and a short-term strategy of unilateral or bilateral 
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less true for the refugee regime because the more powerful liberal states need 
this regime for situational exigencies—to manage massive refugee flows that can 
destabilize governments and, in some cases, entire regions. When such crises 
strike close to home, as in the 1999 Balkan war, the utility of the refugee regime 
goes up exponentially. But when the crisis is past, it drops again.
To date, unwanted labor migrations might be considered more of a nuisance, 
especially from a political standpoint, but they are not fundamentally threaten-
ing and, therefore, can be handled unilaterally and on an ad hoc basis. The 
payoff from international cooperation in the area of unwanted labor migration 
is negative, and opportunities for defection are numerous. The possibilities for 
developing, monitoring, or enforcing some principle of nondiscrimination are 
minimal at this point. That brings us back to the domestic level in our search for 
an explanation of why states risk migration. The three factors driving migration 
policies—cultural and ideational, economic interests, and rights—must be stud-
ied on a case-by-case basis. 
Yet an international market for labor exists and is growing. If the first rule 
of political economy is that markets beget regulation, some type of international 
regime is likely to develop. What will the parameters of such a regime be and 
how will it evolve? International relations theory, especially neoliberal/rationalist 
arguments, offers some clues.
Migration, Trade, and Development: The Coordination Problem
One of the principal effects of economic interdependence is to compel states 
to cooperate (Keohane and Nye 1977; Milner 1988). Increasing international mi-
gration (see Figure 2) is one indicator of interdependence, and it shows no signs 
of abating. As the international market for skilled and unskilled labor grows in 
the coming decades, pressures to create an international regime will increase. 
Following the work of L. Martin (1993, 91–121) and drawing on the preceding 
review of international relations theory, we can identify two ways in which states 
can overcome coordination problems in the absence of trust and reciprocity (de-
veloped states do not trust less developed states to help control borders and 
deter irregular migration): (1) through the centralization of regulatory power and 
pooling of sovereignty, and (2) suasion or, as Martin (1993, 104) puts it, “tactical 
issue linkage.”
We already have seen an example of the first strategy at the regional level in 
Europe. The EU and, to a lesser extent, the Schengen regimes were built through 
processes of centralization and pooling of sovereignty. But, as I have pointed 
out, this was fairly easy to do in the European context because of the symmetry 
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framework (the European Community or EU). It would be much more difficult 
to centralize control of migration in the Americas or Asia, where the asymmetry 
(of interests and power) is much greater and levels of political and economic 
development vary tremendously from one state to another. It is unlikely that 
regional trade regimes like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will lead quickly to cooperation 
in the area of migration. But the beginnings of collaborative arrangements are 
there, just as they were with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in the early 1950s. The regional option—multilateralism for a relevant group of 
states—is one way to overcome collective-action problems and begin a process 
of centralization.
Most international regimes have had a long gestation period, beginning as 
bilateral or regional agreements. It is unlikely, however, that an international mi-
gration regime could be built following the example of the International Trade 
Organization/GATT/WTO. It is too difficult to fulfill the prerequisites of multilat-
eralism: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity. 
The norm of nondiscrimination (equivalent of MFN) does not exist, and there 
are no mechanisms for punishing free riders and no way of resolving disputes. 
In short, as depicted in Figure 1, the basis for multilateralism is weak, and the 
institutional framework is very weak. 
With the asymmetry of interests and power between developed (migration 














World totalTrade, Migration, and Economic Development  23
only viable strategy for overcoming collective-action problems, whether at the re-
gional or international level. L. Martin (1993, 104–06) points to a number of ways 
in which suasion can help solve coordination problems.
Step one is to develop a dominant strategy, which can be accomplished only 
by the most powerful states, using international organizations to persuade or 
coerce smaller and weaker states. From the standpoint of receiving countries, the 
orderly movement of people, defined in terms of rule of law and respect for state 
sovereignty, would be the principal objective of hegemonic, liberal states. From 
the standpoint of the sending countries, migration for development, taking ad-
vantage of remittances and return (brain gain) migration, would be the principle 
upon which an international regime could be based.
Step two is to persuade other states to accept the dominant strategy. This will 
necessitate tactical issue linkage, which involves identifying issues and interests 
not necessarily related to migration (such as MFN, for example) and using these 
as leverage to compel or coerce states to accept the dominant strategy. This is, 
in effect, an “international logroll.” Such tactics will have only the appearance of 
multilateralism, at least initially. Tactical issue linkage was considered in negotia-
tions between the U.S. and Mexico on NAFTA, and migration issues have figured 
prominently in negotiations between the EU and prospective EU members in 
East Central Europe. At the EU summit in Seville in 2002, the British and Span-
ish attempted to link official development aid and trade concessions for African 
states to migration control, but this initiative was blocked by the French and the 
Swedes. 
In such instances, reciprocity is specific rather than diffuse. Individual states 
may  be  rewarded  for  their  cooperation  in  controlling  emigration.  Again,  we   
have seen many bilateral examples of this type of strategic interaction between 
the states of Western and Eastern Europe. The post-unification German govern-
ments have cut a number of deals with East Central European states to gain   
their cooperation in the fight against irregular migration. In the case of Poland, 
this has involved investments and debt relief as well as greater freedom of move-
ment for Polish nationals in Germany. But liberal-democratic states may face a 
problem of credibility in pursuing these types of strategies. They need interna-
tional organizations to give them greater credibility (cover) and facilitate these 
logrolls. 
The third step for hegemonic states is to move from what is an essentially 
one-sided, manipulative game to a multilateral process and eventually to insti-
tutionalize this process. The long-term benefits of such a strategy for receiving 
states are obvious. It will be less costly to build an international regime than to 
fight every step of the way with every sending state, relying only on unilateral 
or bilateral agreements. This may entail some short-term loss of control (such as 
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for long-term stability and more orderly migration. The ultimate payoff for liberal 
states is the establishment of a liberal world order based upon rule of law, respect 
for state sovereignty, ease of travel, and the smoother functioning of international 
labor markets. The payoff for sending states is greater freedom of movement for 
their nationals, greater foreign reserves and a more favorable balance of payments 
(thanks to remittances), increased prospects for return (brain gain) migration, and 
increases in cultural and economic exchange, including technology transfers. 
However, changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War 
have altered this game in several ways. First, it has made defection easier. Since 
1990, states have been more likely to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies by clos-
ing their borders and not cooperating with neighboring states in the making of 
migration and refugee policies. The Schengen process itself is a kind of beggar-thy-
neighbor policy on a regional scale. Second, the new post-Cold War configurations 
of interests and power, both at the international and domestic levels, make it more 
difficult to pursue a multilateral strategy for controlling international migration. 
Rights-markets coalitions have been breaking apart in the dominant liberal states, 
increasing polarization and politicization over immigration and refugee issues. Yet 
liberalization and democratization in formerly authoritarian states to the east and 
south have dramatically reduced the transaction costs for emigration (Hollifield and 
Jillson 1999). Initially, this caused panic in Western Europe, where there was a fear 
of mass migrations from east to west. Headlines screamed, “The Russians are Com-
ing!”32 Even though these massive flows did not materialize, Western states began to 
hunker down and search for ways to reduce or stop immigration. The time horizons 
of almost all Western democracies suddenly were much shorter because of these 
changes in domestic and international politics. Migration came to be perceived as 
a greater threat to national security (Huntington 2004).
If the U.S. were to defect from the liberal refugee and migration “regimes,” 
such as they are, it could mean the collapse of these regimes. In game theoretic 
terms, such a defection would fundamentally alter the equilibrium outcome, and 
it would be potentially costly to all states and the international community. At 
least as far as migration is concerned, the process of globalization of exchange 
could be quickly and dramatically reversed.
To prevent the collapse of liberal migration and refugee regimes, the U.S. 
and other liberal states must pursue an aggressive strategy of multilateralism, 
taking the short-term political heat for long-term political stability and economic 
gain. This happened in the areas of international finance, with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and trade, with the Latin debt crisis of 
the 1980s and Asian crisis of the 1990s. Without the kind of leadership exhibited 
in international trade and finance, irregular migrations will increase and become 
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Conclusion
The two central questions this paper poses are (1) how can we explain in-
creasing migration in the face of strong political opposition and (2) why are states 
willing to risk migration? Several hypotheses, derived from international relations 
theory, are advanced. The first is the realist, or national security, argument that 
states open and close their borders in response to changes in the structure of 
the international system. The problem with this argument is that such structural 
changes (for example, shifts in the distribution of power) are relatively rare. But 
this type of change did occur in 1990 with the end of the Cold War, and there is 
considerable evidence that the willingness of (liberal) states to risk migration de-
clined dramatically in the 1990s. Coalitions of left- and right-wing liberals—what 
I term rights-markets coalitions—that had flourished during much of the Cold 
War period suddenly came under pressure and fell apart in many liberal societies. 
But we have not seen a concomitant decline in the rate of international migra-
tion.
An alternative hypothesis is offered by what I call globalization theory, de-
rived largely from world-systems arguments. According to this thesis, migration 
is largely a function of changes in the international division of labor and restruc-
turing of the global economy, which entails rapid and massive movements of 
productive factors, including capital and labor. Globalization is a social and eco-
nomic imperative, and even the most powerful states are incapable of regulating 
flows of capital, goods, services, information, and people. The result has been 
the rise of new global centers of production, what Sassen calls the “global city,” 
which is outside the regulatory reach of the state. The demand for (skilled and 
unskilled) foreign labor is embedded in the economies of the advanced industrial 
societies.
In such pure globalization arguments, it makes little sense to study either 
domestic or international politics as a way of understanding increases in inter-
national exchange, whether in finance, trade, or migration. Sovereignty is an 
antiquated concept, and we must think about the global economy in terms of 
postnationalism. Soysal, Jacobson, and Bauböck have argued that, with respect to 
migration, globalization of the economy has created a new kind of postnational 
membership, or in Bauböck’s terms, a transnational citizenship. Rights, according 
to Jacobson, now extend across borders. Such political developments are the logi-
cal counterpart of globalization. 
The globalization thesis, in which outcomes are socially and economically 
determined, stands at the opposite extreme of realism, in which outcomes are 
politically determined. A third perspective, neoliberalism, accepts the continuing 
importance of the nation-state in international relations. But neoliberals argue 
that economic interdependence has altered the way in which states think about 2  James F. Hollifield
and use power. Rather than relying on traditional military means to pursue na-
tional interests, liberal states are increasingly drawn into “collaboration games” 
to regulate the international economy and reduce the risks associated with trade 
in particular. This desire to reduce risks and lower transaction costs has led the 
most powerful states to construct international regimes for trade and finance. Un-
like neorealists, neoliberal theorists do not consider the unitary-actor assumption 
to be sacrosanct, and they are willing to look at domestic politics, especially at 
coalitions and institutions that may facilitate openness and increase demand for 
international cooperation.
Following neoliberal and neorealist thought, I have argued that the rise in 
migration in the postwar period is closely linked to three factors: (1) the structure 
of the international system, including the distribution of power and the presence 
or absence of international regimes; (2) domestic political coalitions, based on 
economic interests (factor proportions and intensities) and rights (which flow 
from liberal constitutions and laws); and (3) ideational, cultural, and legal factors, 
or what Brubaker calls “traditions of citizenship and nationhood.”
During the Cold War, liberal states were more willing to risk migration because 
of the bipolar nature of the international system, which prevented large-scale 
emigration from communist states and helped solidify rights-markets coalitions in 
liberal states. The end of the Cold War has radically altered the configuration of 
power and interests, at both the national and international levels, and changed 
the dynamic of collaboration games, especially with migration. States are still will-
ing to risk trade, and coalitions of liberal states led by the United States support 
the institutions for maintaining stable exchange rates, especially the IMF. There is 
evidence, however, that multilateralism in these areas is under increasing political 
pressure, especially in the U.S. Isolationism and protectionism are stirring anew.
The logic of cooperation is different for trade than for migration. Liberal 
states work hard to keep trade and investment flowing in the world economy 
and increasingly work hard to keep migration, including refugees, bottled up 
in less developed (sending) countries. The international trade regime (WTO) is 
based squarely on the doctrine of comparative advantage and the principle of 
nondiscrimination (MFN). Free trade has come to be accepted by a wide range of 
states as an international public good. Ironically, following the Stolper–Samuelson 
theorem of factor price equalization, trade and foreign direct investment are often 
touted as the solution to the problem of unwanted migration. According to this 
theorem, trade can substitute for migration in the long term. Nevertheless, migra-
tion continues in the short term and may actually increase when less developed 
economies are exposed to strong exogenous shocks of trade and foreign invest-
ment.
No organizing principle has emerged as a basis for international cooperation 
to regulate migration. The exceptions are the international refugee regime, based Trade, Migration, and Economic Development  2
on a well-founded fear of persecution, and the EU regime, based on freedom 
of movement for nationals of member states. The primary reason for the lack 
of cooperation and the absence of an international regime for migration is the 
tremendous asymmetry between interests and power in the international system. 
The challenge for proponents of an international migration regime is to find (1) 
an organizing principle and (2) a strategy for overcoming collaboration problems. 
In the penultimate section of this paper, I suggest a principle—namely rule of 
law and the orderly movement of people—and several strategies for overcoming 
the asymmetry of interests and regime building. These strategies include the cen-
tralization of authority to promote trust and provide information and enforcement 
mechanisms. The problem with this strategy is that it requires continuous and 
strong intervention by a hegemon or group of hegemonic states. A more likely 
strategy is suasion, which involves tactical issue linkage and international logrolls 
that link unrelated issues to cooperation in controlling emigration.
The central argument in this paper is that states will not continue to risk 
migration in the post-Cold War era without some type of international regula-
tory framework. If migration is closely linked to trade and investment both eco-
nomically and politically, as I and many others have argued, any weakening on 
the part of liberal states in their commitment to support orderly movements of 
people could threaten the new liberal world order. This argument is at odds with 
the globalization thesis, inasmuch as I see politics and the nation-state as crucial 
to the stability of the global economy, especially with the end of the Cold War. 
To paraphrase Polanyi (1944, 140), without the “continuous, centrally organized, 
and controlled intervention” of the most powerful liberal states, the “simple and 
natural liberty” of the global economy will not survive. Globalization is a myth, 
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